Suitability Reports Under Inspection: What the AMF Found When Illiquid Funds Deteriorated

Suitability Reports Under Inspection: What the AMF Found When Illiquid Funds Deteriorated

From the second half of 2023, French non-listed real estate funds known as SCPIs went through a sharp reversal. Unit prices were cut, redemption queues lengthened and some funds set up redemption funds to help investors exit. In October 2026 the AMF published the summary of four SPOT inspections examining how investment firms had communicated with their clients about these products through that period.

The report covers product governance, marketing materials, network training and controls. This article focuses on one part of it: the suitability assessment and the justification of advice. That is where the findings travel furthest, because every firm giving investment advice in the EU works from the same Article 54 of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/565. The Assessment of Suitability: Fundamentals and Practical Implementation seminar covers that framework from start to finish.

1. Suitability Assessment and Advice Justification

All four firms inspected had chosen investment advice as their only distribution model for SCPIs. The AMF recorded this as a good practice. Advice requires the firm to collect full know-your-client information and to give the client a personalised suitability report before the subscription.

To test how this worked in practice, the inspection team selected one SCPI at each firm whose characteristics had deteriorated since July 2023. It then analysed the ten most recent subscriptions in that SCPI made following investment advice, 40 transactions in total.

By the time it reached the suitability reports, the team had already found gaps in the pre-contractual information and in the marketing materials. It therefore treated the suitability report as the last opportunity to give the client useful information before subscribing, and examined it closely.

What this means in practice: When information earlier in the client journey is incomplete, the suitability report is where the gap gets judged. A report written as a formality cannot carry that weight.

2. KYC Questionnaire Shortcomings

None of the four firms changed its know-your-client questionnaire after the market turned. The AMF considered the questionnaire sufficient at only one of them, because it included a question that explicitly drew the client's attention to the low liquidity of SCPIs.

At the other three firms, no question addressed the low liquidity of SCPIs or the deterioration of their fundamentals. At one firm, several clients in the sample had either not been asked about these points or had stated that they had no experience of SCPIs. They were still recommended SCPIs, with no specific warning in their suitability report.

The AMF recorded breaches of Article L. 533-15 (I) of the French Monetary and Financial Code and of Articles 54(2) and 55(1) of Delegated Regulation 2017/565. Article 55(1) requires the information on a client's knowledge and experience to cover, among other things, the types of financial instrument the client is familiar with.

What this means in practice: A general question about investment experience does not establish knowledge of a specific product type. Where liquidity is the defining risk of a product, the questionnaire should test whether the client understands it.

3. Over-Standardised Suitability Reports

The suitability reports at all four firms were highly standardised. The justification did not change from one SCPI to another, even though the funds did not share the same characteristics and were not all facing the same difficulties.

The reports made little or no mention of the potential risks, the adverse context, the fall in unit value or the liquidity pressures. They did not explain why, at the time of the advice, exposure to an illiquid and possibly depreciated SCPI remained a suitable investment in view of the client's situation.

The AMF was careful on one point. A deteriorating market does not automatically make every recommendation unsuitable. But known facts such as a fall in unit price, longer exit times, the existence of a redemption fund or worsening performance indicators must be taken into account in the suitability analysis and communicated to the client.

It also made clear that a mere mention of liquidity risk is not enough once that risk has materialised. In a deteriorating market, liquidity risk can mean a temporary inability to exit, partial execution of a redemption request, a prolonged wait or a sale at a lower price than expected.

Two further details stand out. One firm gave clients an additional document, not required by the rules and more detailed than the suitability report, setting out risks specific to SCPIs. The AMF noted that its content was still identical whichever SCPI was recommended. And at two firms, the compliance function had identified after July 2023 that the justification of advice needed strengthening, yet this never translated into the recommendations clients received.

The AMF recorded breaches of Article L. 533-15 (II) of the Monetary and Financial Code and Article 54(12) of Delegated Regulation 2017/565, together with the obligations to act honestly, fairly and professionally in the best interests of clients and to provide accurate, clear and not misleading information.

What this means in practice: Personalisation is usually read as tailoring the report to the client. This report adds a second dimension. The justification must also reflect the specific product and its condition on the day the advice is given.

4. Improper Transfer of Responsibility to Clients

At one firm, the internal concentration thresholds by asset class and by financial instrument were exceeded in a significant proportion of the subscriptions analysed. The suitability report contained an alert inviting the client to diversify. It then concluded, in a standardised notice, that the advice was suitable with regard to all financial criteria.

The firm explained that the alert was designed to flag the issue to the advisor during the meeting, so that the advice could be adapted. The AMF found no concrete adaptation of the advice and no strengthened justification. In its view, the firm had not justified the suitability of its advice and had transferred final responsibility for assessing suitability to the client.

The AMF cited Article 54(1) of Delegated Regulation 2017/565, which requires firms not to create any ambiguity or confusion about their responsibilities in the suitability assessment, and points 14 and 15 of the ESMA guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID II suitability requirements (ESMA35-43-3172). Point 15 makes clear that disclaimers aimed at limiting the firm's responsibility do not change how the service is characterised or how the firm's compliance is assessed.

What this means in practice: An alert that fires and changes nothing is not a control. When an internal threshold is breached, either the advice changes or the report explains, in concrete terms, why the recommendation still stands.

5. Credit-Financed (Leveraged) Subscriptions

The AMF described credit financing as a determining factor in the suitability analysis, not a peripheral one. Borrowing can amplify the effect of a fall in unit value and of exit difficulties. The client may have to keep repaying the loan even when the units lose value, when the income distributed no longer covers the cost of financing or when the sale of the units is delayed.

At two firms, the suitability reports given to clients who had borrowed to buy SCPI units contained no personalised explanation of these risks, and no other document had raised them. At the first firm, 40% of the files examined involved credit financing without the associated risks being explained in the suitability report. At the second, the proportion was 20%. The AMF noted that it had already raised this concern in April 2025, in a letter to ASPIM, the French real estate investment funds association.

The two firms with no credit-financed subscriptions in the sample both had something in place. One firm's procedures provided for a specific notice in the suitability report. The other gave clients a standardised document on the risks of credit financing.

What this means in practice: Leverage changes the risk profile of the whole transaction. If a client is borrowing to invest, the report should say so and explain what happens to the loan if the investment falls in value or cannot be sold.

6. Good Practices Identified

Alongside the failings, the AMF highlighted four good practices that relate directly to suitability:

  • Investment advice as the exclusive distribution model for SCPIs, so that every subscription follows a personalised recommendation.
  • Concentration controls, blocking or non-blocking, that alert the advisor when the client's portfolio exceeds the firm's thresholds by asset class or by financial instrument.
  • A tool to help advisors formalise their advice, which supports the justification of suitability while leaving the advisor responsible for adapting it to the client's specific situation.
  • A before and after view in the suitability report, showing the client's exposure to risky assets and the volatility of their portfolio before and after the recommendation, to illustrate consistency with the client's profile.

7. What to Check in Your Own Suitability Files

The questions below are drawn from the findings above. They are a practitioner's reading of the report, not a list published by the AMF.

  1. Does your questionnaire test knowledge of the specific product type, including its liquidity, rather than investment experience in general?
  2. When a client has no experience of the product, does the report say so and explain why the recommendation still stands?
  3. Does the justification change from one product to another, or is it the same paragraph for every fund?
  4. When a product's condition changes, does that context reach the suitability report?
  5. Does the report explain what exiting could look like in practice, rather than only stating that the product is illiquid?
  6. When an internal threshold is breached, does the advice change, or does the report justify the exception in concrete terms?
  7. Does any wording in the report suggest that the client decides whether the investment is suitable?
  8. Where the investment is financed by a loan, does the report explain the financing risk?
  9. Do your file reviews test the quality of the justification, or only whether a report exists?

The Assessment of Suitability: Fundamentals and Practical Implementation seminar walks through the full suitability framework, from know-your-client information to the suitability report. For a quick audit of your own process, start with the free MiFID II Suitability Assessment Compliance Checklist.

8. Beyond SCPIs

The products in this campaign were French, but most of the rules the AMF applied are EU rules. Articles 54 and 55 of Delegated Regulation 2017/565 and the ESMA suitability guidelines apply to every investment firm giving advice in the EU. In my reading, the same questions can be put to any product whose liquidity depends on other investors, including the semi-liquid funds and ELTIFs now being offered to more retail clients. UK firms will recognise the same logic in COBS 9A and in the consumer understanding outcome of the Consumer Duty.

The AMF has looked at the suitability test before, in its inspection of how five firms handled sustainability preferences. The same SCPI report also examines product governance in detail, which is covered in the Product Governance Self-Assessment for Distributors.

Know what supervisors are looking for. The Assessment of Suitability: Fundamentals and Practical Implementation seminar shows what a suitability report needs to contain and how to justify a recommendation for the specific client and product.

Source: AMF, Summary of SPOT inspections on communications to clients in relation to SCPIs, October 2026.

Nikolas Demetriades

Article by Nikolas Demetriades

Published 15 Nov 2026