Who Is Europe's Strictest Financial Regulator? What ESMA's Sanctions Data Shows

Who Is Europe's Strictest Financial Regulator? What ESMA's Sanctions Data Shows

Who is Europe's strictest financial regulator? It is a question I hear often, usually from firms deciding where to set up, where to passport, or how much to worry about their own supervisor.

ESMA's annual sanctions reports are the closest thing to an objective answer. The latest edition, covering 2025, was published on 15 October 2026. I read it alongside the two reports before it, covering 2023 and 2024. The short answer is that there is no single strictest regulator. There are three, depending on what you measure: financial penalties, enforcement volume, or consequences for a firm's ability to keep operating.

France fines the most. Hungary records the most sanctions and measures. And in ESMA's 2025 data, Cyprus was the only EEA country that used MiFID II temporary bans, suspensions and licence withdrawals.

1. The EEA picture: three years, one flat line

The table below sets out the headline totals from the three reports. They cover administrative sanctions and measures under the legislation in ESMA's remit, including MiFID II and MiFIR, MAR, AIFMD, the UCITS Directive, EMIR, CSDR and the Prospectus Regulation. MiCA and SFTR are also in scope, and 2025 was the first year in which any sanctions or measures were actually imposed under either of them.

YearSanctions and measuresTotal administrative fines
2023976EUR 71,259,970
2024975EUR 100,186,062
2025955EUR 81,896,178

For 2025, 30 national authorities submitted data to ESMA, and sanctions were imposed in 29 of the EEA jurisdictions covered. The number of sanctions and measures is almost unchanged from one year to the next. The total value moves because of a handful of very large fines. ESMA also notes that enforcement became more geographically concentrated in 2025, with Germany, France and Spain together accounting for 66% of the total value of fines.

2. Who is the strictest? It depends on the measure

To answer the question on the numbers alone, I combined 2024 and 2025 to smooth out one-off fines and ranked each EEA country in four different ways. The table below shows the top five on each measure.

Rank

By total fines

By number of sanctions and measures

By fine value per sanction or measure

Combined score

1

France (approx. EUR 47.2m)

Hungary (371)

Ireland*

France

2

Germany (approx. EUR 39.3m)

Italy (195)

Germany

Germany

3

Spain (approx. EUR 24.6m)

Czechia

France

Hungary

4

Sweden (approx. EUR 15.3m)

France

Netherlands

Spain

5

Norway (approx. EUR 9.2m)

Greece

Norway

Italy

How these rankings were built: ESMA does not publish a ranking of national regulators. These rankings are my own analysis of ESMA's data. ESMA's Annex II gives each country's share of total fine value and of the total number of sanctions and measures for 2024 and 2025. I applied those shares to the yearly EEA totals and pooled the two years. Because the published shares are rounded, the euro amounts and most counts are approximate. Hungary's and Italy's counts are taken directly from ESMA's annual figures.

The combined score is defined as 0.5 × the country's share of pooled 2024 to 2025 administrative fine value + 0.5 × its share of pooled 2024 to 2025 sanctions and measures. The equal weighting is my choice. A different weighting could produce a different order.

Fine value per sanction or measure divides a country's fines by all of its sanctions and measures, including non-financial ones such as orders to cease and desist. It is not the average size of a fine.

Finally, ESMA counts each sanction or measure separately, even where several arise from the same case. A fine and a ban imposed on one company count as two. None of the counts in this article should be read as a number of separate cases, or as a firm's probability of being sanctioned.

*Ireland's position reflects a very small denominator. It recorded only around four sanctions and measures across the two years, so a single sizeable fine moves its average sharply. Averages built on so few observations are highly sensitive and should be read with that in mind.

On the combined score, France comes out on top, followed by Germany, Hungary, Spain and Italy. Sweden is just outside the top five.

3. France and Germany: the money

France imposed the highest value of fines across the two years. In 2024, it accounted for 29.34% of all fine value in the EEA. In 2025, its total was EUR 17,830,000.

Germany overtook France in 2025 alone, with EUR 23,355,500, of which EUR 22,422,500 was imposed under MiFID II and MiFIR. That included the two largest fines of the year, EUR 7.4 million each, both for breaches of Article 16(4) of MiFID II on organisational requirements and both imposed through a settlement procedure.

Spain was third in 2025 with EUR 12,545,000. Of that, EUR 7,740,000 came from 11 fines for market manipulation under Article 15 of MAR.

4. Hungary: the volume

Hungary records the highest volume of sanctions and measures in the EEA by a wide margin, and has done for three years. ESMA reports that Hungary imposed 109 sanctions and measures in 2023, 182 in 2024 and 189 in 2025. In 2025, that was 20% of the EEA total.

Volume, however, is not the same as severity. Of Hungary's 189 sanctions and measures in 2025, 85 (45%) were orders to cease and desist. Hungary accounted for 0.89% of the value of fines imposed in the EEA that year.

ESMA also observes that, under AIFMD, the highest number of sanctions and measures was recorded in Hungary, "where the market remains comparatively small".

5. Cyprus: the tools

Cyprus does not stand out in the overall totals. It stands out in MiFID II, and in the type of measure it uses.

MeasureCyprus
MiFID II and MiFIR sanctions and measures, 202534, third highest in the EEA after Hungary (43) and Italy (40)
Total value of MiFID II and MiFIR fines, 2025Third highest in the EEA after Germany and France
Share of all EEA sanctions and measures0.82% in 2024, 3.56% in 2025
Share of total EEA fine value1.10% in 2024, 3.19% in 2025

According to the report, the MiFID II temporary bans (six),the suspension of an authorisation (one) and the withdrawals of an authorisation (two) reported for 2025 were all imposed in Cyprus. No other EEA country reported using any of these three measures under MiFID II during the year. In 2024, one of the five MiFID II withdrawals recorded across the EEA was also in Cyprus.

This needs one qualification. Under AIFMD, Czechia withdrew 29 authorisations in 2025. Cyprus's distinction is specific to MiFID II.

The earlier reports also put 2025 in context. In 2023, Cyprus imposed 38 sanctions and measures under MiFID II, the second highest number in the EEA after Denmark. Its share fell sharply in 2024 and returned in 2025. In my view, 2024 looks more like the dip than 2025 looks like the spike.

The report is equally clear about where no enforcement was recorded in Cyprus. No sanctions were imposed under MAR in 2024 or 2025, and none under the UCITS Directive since 2016. ESMA notes that Cyprus has one of the smallest markets in the EEA by market capitalisation and very few UCITS managers.

What this means in practice: For a Cyprus-licensed investment firm, the realistic downside of a serious MiFID II failure is not only a fine. It can be a ban, a suspension or the loss of the authorisation itself.

6. What drew MiFID II sanctions across the EEA

Across the EEA as a whole, the main provisions behind MiFID II enforcement remained broadly consistent with 2024.

Organisational requirements and client information. Most MiFID II sanctions and measures were imposed under Article 16 (organisational requirements) and Article 24 (general principles and information to clients).

Suitability and appropriateness. ESMA reports a strong increase in sanctions and measures under Article 25 compared with 2024.

Settlements. Of the EUR 37.3 million in MiFID II pecuniary sanctions in 2025, 75% by value was imposed through settlement, more than twice the 2024 share of 35%.

What this means in practice: The provisions attracting the most enforcement are the foundations of a MiFID II framework: governance, systems and controls, client information and suitability. These are areas that can be tested and evidenced internally before a supervisor tests them.

7. How the EEA compares with the UK and the US

ESMA's 2025 report includes its own comparison with the United Kingdom and the United States, in two footnotes. The headline figures in the table below come from that same document, ESMA43-502934634-2902, which cites the FCA and the SEC as its sources. Where the FCA and SEC pages that ESMA cites add useful detail, I have shown it separately and labelled it.

 EEAUnited Kingdom (FCA)United States (SEC)
Headline value (as reported by ESMA)EUR 81,896,178 in administrative fines (EUR 83,753,645 in all pecuniary sanctions and measures)Approximately EUR 143.5 million in fines (GBP 124,221,367)USD 17.9 billion in orders for monetary relief
Volume (as reported by ESMA)955 sanctions and measures, including 510 administrative fines23 administrative fines456 enforcement actions filed
Detail from the cited source 21 FCA fines totalling GBP 124,221,367.45, plus two separate court fines listed on the same pageUSD 1.4 billion in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and USD 1.3 billion in civil penalties, after the SEC's own exclusions
Period20252025Fiscal year 2025

The FCA count. ESMA's footnote refers to 23 fines. The FCA's 2025 list does contain 23 entries, but two of them are fines imposed by the courts in FCA prosecutions. The remaining 21 FCA fines sum exactly to GBP 124,221,367.45, the published total, which excludes court fines. Using ESMA's conversion of approximately EUR 143.5 million, that is roughly EUR 6.8 million per FCA fine, against roughly EUR 160,000 per administrative fine in the EEA jurisdictions covered by ESMA's dataset.

The SEC figure. The USD 17.9 billion is the SEC's headline figure for monetary relief ordered in fiscal year 2025. The SEC itself also reports adjusted figures of USD 1.4 billion in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and USD 1.3 billion in civil penalties. These exclude amounts treated as satisfied through other proceedings and the judgments in the long-running Stanford litigation. Neither the headline nor the adjusted figures represent cash actually collected.

What the comparison can and cannot show. The headline numbers are useful context, and on them the FCA alone imposed more in fines than the EEA jurisdictions covered by ESMA's dataset combined. They are not a comparison of equivalent misconduct. ESMA's dataset excludes AML enforcement. The FCA total does not, and a substantial part of it relates to financial crime and AML controls, including GBP 44.1 million imposed on Nationwide Building Society for failings in financial crime controls and GBP 39.3 million imposed on Barclays Bank plc in connection with money laundering risks. The SEC figure is monetary relief rather than administrative fines, measured over a different period. The table shows three different enforcement systems side by side, not three comparable totals.

8. Reading the data carefully

ESMA is explicit about the limits of its own figures, and three of them matter for any "strictest" ranking.

AML is excluded. The report covers only legislation within ESMA's remit. Sanctions imposed under the anti-money laundering framework, or under purely national rules, are not included. Criminal sanctions are reported separately and are not part of the rankings above.

Numbers are not effectiveness. ESMA states that conclusions about the effectiveness of a national authority's supervision should not be drawn solely from the number or value of sanctions. Informal tools such as warning letters are not counted.

Market size matters. The size and maturity of each national market affects how many sanctions are imposed. France and Germany are among the largest markets in the EEA, which partly explains their position on value. The data in the reports does not allow a full adjustment for market size.

9. Where this is heading

ESMA's stated aim is greater convergence in how national authorities use their sanctioning powers, supported by more transparent data. It concludes that there is room for more convergence, in particular "where the limited enforcement activity is not related to the market size". The report will continue to be published annually, with the underlying data available for download.

Until that convergence arrives, the honest answer to "who is the strictest?" depends on what your firm stands to lose. For the size of a fine, look at France and Germany. For the volume of recorded sanctions and measures, look at Hungary. For your licence, look at Cyprus.

Know what supervisors are looking for. Our seminars, including Assessment of Suitability and MiFID II Functional Responsibilities, are built around the provisions that enforcement data shows supervisors pursue most often.

Explore seminars at cpds.academy

Sources

DocumentReferencePublished
ESMA, Sanctions and measures imposed in Member States in 2025 (source of the headline UK and US comparison figures, footnotes 36 and 47)ESMA43-502934634-290215 October 2026
ESMA, Sanctions and measures imposed in Member States in 2024ESMA43-1527801302-182816 October 2025
ESMA, Sanctions and measures imposed under AIFMD, BMR, CSDR, ECSPR, EMIR, MAR, MiCA, MiFID II - MiFIR, PR, SFTR and UCITS in 2023ESMA43-1527801302-133311 October 2024
FCA, 2025 fines (cited by ESMA, and source of the 21-fine breakdown)fca.org.uk 
SEC press release 2026-34 (cited by ESMA, and source of the adjusted figures)sec.gov 

This article is for general information and professional development purposes only and does not constitute legal or regulatory advice. Figures are taken from the sources listed above. Rankings and approximate amounts are my own calculations from ESMA's published data, as explained in section 2.

Nikolas Demetriades

Article by Nikolas Demetriades

Published 08 Nov 2026